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Digital Weberianism: Bureaucracy, 
Information, and the Techno-rationality of 
Neoliberal Capitalism? 
CHRIS MUELLERLEILE**AND SUSAN L. ROBERTSON*** 
ABSTRACT 
The social infrastructures that constitute both public and private 
administration are increasingly entangled with digital code, big data, 
and algorithms. While some argue these technologies have blown apart 
the strictures of bureaucratic order, we see more subtle changes at work. 
We suggest that far from a radical rupture, in today’s digitizing society, 
there are strong traces of the logic and techniques of Max Weber’s bureau; 
a foundational concept in his account of the symbiotic relationship 
between modernity, capitalism, and social order. We suggest the manner 
through which these techniques have shaped contemporary systems of 
social administration helps explain the remarkable legitimacy digital 
governance has acquired. We do this by exploring how digital 
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technologies draw from, and give new substance to, the three key 
principles of Weber’s theory of the bureau—efficiency, objectivity, and 
rationality. We argue that neoliberalism, or the widespread 
economization of politics, has conditioned the digital versions of these 
principles, not least by subordinating social ends to technical means. At 
the same time we argue that digitalism engenders the privatization of 
authority, not least through its “elective affinity” with market logics. 
I.  NEW ORDER 
At the heart of our digitally mediated world is a social paradox that 
arcs between order and emancipation. On the one hand, digital 
technologies appear to have contributed to a new era of openness, 
adaptability, and transparency in the spheres of public and private 
administration.1 For instance, it requires little effort, cost, or 
transportation to enroll in online university classes with preeminent 
scholars. It has become routine to track passport renewals through the 
Home Office and know in every instance its change in status. Anyone 
with an internet connection can view seemingly endless hours of 
legislative deliberation and international diplomacy, sometimes in the 
form of leaked documents, from the comfort of their home, and it is 
similarly convenient to publicly comment on government (in)efficiencies 
or corporate performance through online ratings. 
These affordances have led celebrants of digital technologies to 
argue that the hierarchical governing typical of the classic bureaucracy 
has collapsed.2 It is proposed that the porosity of boundaries around 
previously impervious social categories, like public and private, can be 
understood as the proverbial rusting away of the iron cage of modern 
bureaucratic life, giving rise to new freedoms, new social relations, and 
new cognitive orientations.3 In this emancipated world, cities are now 
“smart” because of constant data representations and possibilities for 
real-time feedback. Science and academic research are now “open,” no 
longer cloistered in intellectual citadels. Data is now “big” and 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (discussing the production and 
freedom of information, knowledge, and culture as well as their effects on the way we see 
the state of the world). 
 2. See generally Daniel Kreiss et al., The Limits of Peer Production: Some Reminders 
from Max Weber for the Network Society, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC. 243 (2011) (exposing the 
analytical weaknesses in the consensus view and offering a new perspective for studying 
contemporary digital media). 
 3. See id. See generally R.A.W. RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE: POLICY 
NETWORKS, GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1997) (discussing 
developments in British government). 
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accessible for interpretation and interrogation by amateurs and experts 
alike.  
Yet, rather than less bureaucracy, we seem to experience its 
propagation and expansion at every turn. There has been a rapid 
proliferation of procedures, rules, and new forms of surveillance 
approaching what some have called “total”4 or “universal” 
bureaucratization.5 Whether interacting with corporations, markets, 
governments, or just other people, contemporary life seems to be 
drowning in a tsunami of rule-based, digitally-mediated, interactions. 
The list is long and growing, from e-government to online commercial 
transactions, navigation systems, credit and identity checks, data-
driven reputation tables, and so on. Purchases are logged, performances 
are evaluated, preferences and decisions are archived, and suggestions 
are put to us based on what others read, do, and think. 
The accumulation of data, recognition of patterns, and profiling of 
the social body is not limited to individuals or relationships between 
them. Large data sets are being created and consumed by public and 
private institutions alike. From small spinoff companies to large 
corporations, governments to think tanks and specialist data firms, all 
are engaged in combining, recombining, and presenting data to tell new 
stories about social life. Universities, publishers, and funding bodies 
track academic texts with digital object identifiers like ORCID, not 
unlike the radio-frequency identification (RFID) microchips embedded 
in commodities, passports, and pets, if not human bodies.6 Universities 
gather massive amounts of data on their researchers, teachers, and 
student bodies; buy space on commercial platforms; upload data; and 
buy it back as reputational values. The list goes on.  
What are we to make of this state of affairs? The apparent paradox, 
of both greater transparency and greater opacity, or of emancipation, 
but with greater control and order, produces more questions than it 
                                                                                                     
 4. See DAVID GRAEBER, THE UTOPIA OF RULES: ON TECHNOLOGY, STUPIDITY AND THE 
SECRET JOYS OF BUREAUCRACY 18 (2015). 
 5. See BEATRICE HIBOU, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD IN THE NEOLIBERAL 
ERA: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 15 (2015). 
 6. ORCID codes or Open Researcher and Contributor IDs are internationally 
standardized alphanumeric codes that uniquely identify academic and scientific authors. 
They are similar to digital object identifiers (DOI) that are used to identify texts, but in 
the case of ORCID they are attached to and identify people. See ORCID, https://orcid.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2018). Proponents argue that academic DOIs improve efficiency, 
which is most likely true. Others argue that academic DOIs such as ORCID also enable 
new forms of enclosure, commodification, and marketization. For a discussion, see Chris 
Muellerleile, Open Access Panacea: Scarcity, Abundance, and Enclosure in the New 
Economy of Academic Knowledge Production, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SCIENCE 132 (David Tyfield et al. eds., 2017). 
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answers.7 What, for instance, does “openness” really mean, to whom, 
and in relation to what?8 If, as Deleuze argued, the important 
institutions of modernity, such as the factory, the school, and the family, 
are doomed in the new “society of control,” what roles are digital 
technologies and big data playing in their reformulation?9 If the old 
bureaucratic hierarchies have come tumbling down, how do we explain 
greater inequalities and new forms of stratification? In this paper, we 
explore these paradoxes. However, rather than argue that the old 
bureaucratic order has collapsed and that a radically new, post-
bureaucratic order has now emerged, we suggest that key features of 
Weber’s political bureaucracy—efficiency, objectivity, and rationality—
have morphed and given form to a less visible, but no less powerful 
digital bureaucracy.  
No longer is the modern bureaucracy an anonymous world of 
“papers in motion.”10 Rather, the digital bureaucracy is a world of data 
in motion, given direction and shape by new kinds of digital 
infrastructures—from codes to algorithms to platforms, whose digital 
footprint replaces the material archive, and whose experts are the new 
data scientists.11 However, like all institutions of rule, the new digital 
bureaucracy—like Weber’s classical bureaucracy, faces challenges to its 
legitimacy, especially following the erosion of the border between 
economic and political, and public and private life. This struggle over 
legitimation is intensified by the post-modern “condition,” where it is 
seemingly impossible to form consensus around any sort of universal 
truth or knowledge claim, particularly when concerned with a social 
ambition.12 As we demonstrate below, legitimation is now managed 
through the relative disinterest of numbers, the relative distance 
between the architects/experts managing the digital bureau and those 
that it is governing, and the relative alignment between digital 
technologies and the marketization of social relations.  
                                                                                                     
 7. On this general paradox between emancipation and control, not tied directly to 
digital technologies, but nevertheless apt to our general argument, see ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, 
LIQUID MODERNITY (2000); Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on Societies of Control, 59 OCTOBER 
3, 4 (1992). 
 8. For a discussion of the political, economic, and moral complexities of the notion of 
“openness” in academic publishing, see Jana Bacevic and Chris Muellerleile, The Moral 
Economy of Open Access, EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 1 (2017), http://journals.sagepub.com 
/doi/full/10.1177/1368431017717368.  
 9. See Deleuze, supra note 7, at 4. 
 10. See PETER BERGER ET AL., THE HOMELESS MIND: MODERNIZATION AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS 47 (1974). 
 11. See Figure 1 for a sketch. 
 12. See David B. Clarke, Space, Knowledge and Consumption, in KNOWLEDGE, SPACE, 
ECONOMY 209, 209–25 (John R. Bryson et al. eds., 2000). 
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We have organized our argument in the following way. We begin 
with an account of Weber’s notion of bureaucracy, focusing on its DNA: 
the principles of efficiency, objectivity, and rationality. We then review 
the emergence of digital technologies in the context of various 
theorizations of the information society and economy. In light of this, we 
then consider how bureaucratic ordering has been transformed as 
capitalism has become more dependent upon both information and 
neoliberal markets. We then revisit the three fundamental components 
of bureaucratic order, and investigate how they have changed in the 
digital age. In the penultimate section we explore the issue of the 
legitimation of digital governance, and show how techno-scientific 
rationality combined with neoliberal ideology have worked together to 
subordinate social ends to economic means. We conclude by questioning 
the future possibilities of fracturing what we call the silicon web.13 
II.  DEFINING ORDER 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines bureaucracy in the first 
instance as “[g]overnment by officials; a system of government or (in 
later use) administration by a hierarchy of professional administrators 
following clearly defined procedures in a routine and organized 
manner.”14 In this organizational structure of public administration, 
Hegel saw the consummate historical manifestation of human reason 
and social ethics as exemplified in the Prussian state.15 Marx drew upon 
Hegel’s arguments, but was more critical in that he saw the 
bureaucracy as the direct link between civil society and the state, and as 
such, a symptom of the bourgeoisie’s influence over the state.16 For 
                                                                                                     
 13. Our invocation of a web is not unlike the sieve or mesh that Deleuze uses to 
describe the society of control. Referring to the change from Foucault’s “closed” 
disciplinary institutions to the relatively open institutions of the “society of control” he 
says, “[e]nclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-
deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve 
whose mesh will transmute from point to point.” Deleuze, supra note 7, at 4. 
 14. Bureaucracy, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
24905?redirectedFrom=bureaucracy#eid (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). 
 15. See M.W. Jackson, Bureaucracy in Hegel’s Political Theory, 18 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 139, 
149 (1986). Jackson argues that a key distinction between Hegel’s and Weber’s theories of 
(state) bureaucracy is that the former imbues bureaucracy and bureaucrats with an 
ethical imperative to serve the common good. Weber is not unconcerned with ethics, but is 
more interested in the autonomy of bureaucratic structures from the realm of moral-
ethical or “political” questions. For Weber, the bureaucracy is driven first and foremost by 
what we might today call “technocratic” rationality (see the below discussion of various 
forms of Weberian rationality). 
 16. See NICOS P. MOUZELIS, ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
MODERN THEORIES 8–10 (1968). 
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Marx, then, bureaucratic public administration was one of the many 
manifestations of the class dynamics of capitalism.17 
But it was Max Weber who was particularly interested in exploring 
and explaining the institutions of state rule, and particularly how the 
operations of bureaucratic organization produced the legitimacy 
necessary for domination by legal-rational means.18 For Weber, 
bureaucracy was the organizational manifestation of a formal techno-
scientific rationality that in part defined modernity.19 However, as 
Berger et al. point out, while technologically-driven production and 
bureaucratic administration are both key phenomena of modernity, 
there is an important difference between them in that bureaucracy is 
not intrinsic to a particular goal—such as profit making.20 In other 
words, it is not necessary that the bureaucratic form becomes dominant 
in modernity and capitalism. That said, Weber’s bureaucratic form of 
organization, while a contingent alignment in the sense referred to 
above, has nevertheless been a highly synergistic form for the expansion 
of modern capitalism, and as a primary carrier of modernization. 
Weber was broadly interested in how, throughout history, social 
domination appeared as a legitimate form of social order. As opposed to 
“traditional” or “charismatic” domination, which were more common in 
patrimonial or feudal systems, bureaucratic organization is based on 
legal domination, or power that is limited by an abstract, but codified, 
set of rules.21 Weber argued that it was possible to observe bureaucratic 
structures throughout human history, but it was only in the modern 
industrial socio-economy that he found truly efficient and rational 
bureaucratic structures. Crucially, in the maturing industrial 
capitalism of the early twentieth century, he observed that bureaucratic 
ordering was important not only for public administration through what 
he called the “agency,” but also the private administration of large-scale 
production, or what he called the “enterprise.”22 
                                                                                                     
 17. See DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN 
SOCIAL FORECASTING 28?29 (1999). Marx did not spend much time on bureaucracy, 
particularly after his turn to economics, although a critical analysis of bureaucracy is 
implied in much of his critique of the capitalist state. For a thorough discussion of Marx’s 
and Marxism’s conceptions of bureaucracy, see id. at 49–119. 
 18. See generally 1 & 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., 1978) (providing an outline of interpretive sociology). 
 19. See Herbert Marcuse, Industrialization and Capitalism, I/30 NEW LEFT R., 3, 5 
(1965). 
 20. BERGER ET AL., supra note 10, at 41. 
 21. See WEBER, supra note 18, at 217–26. See generally MOUZELIS, supra note 16 
(discussing the study of bureaucracy). 
 22. WEBER, supra note 18, at 956. 
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 Weber’s description of the modern bureaucracy in Chapter XI of 
Economy & Society23 is extensive, and we will not attempt to reproduce 
it here. There are, however, three crucial characteristics of a Weberian 
bureaucracy that need a clear definition at the outset.24 The first is that 
the labor of bureaucratic administration is divided up into offices or 
“bureaus” constituted by professional and specialized workers who are, 
or have, the potential to become, technical experts.25 Bureaucratic 
officials are thus hired and promoted based on objective criteria related 
to this vocation or expertise. Second, the bureau is managed according 
to a codified and exhaustive set of procedures or rules, as well as 
through a managerial hierarchy, the rulings of which are subject to 
appeal and potential redress.26 And third, the bureau is constituted out 
of its management of communication and information, or what Weber 
calls “the files,”27 and Berger et al. call “papers in motion.”28 In other 
words, a bureaucracy is an organizational form reliant upon, and 
designed to, exert control over information, knowledge, and 
communication.29 
Extending his argument from these three characteristics, Weber 
explores the broad outcomes of social ordering based on these three 
interrelated principles that are constitutive of bureaucratic ordering: 
efficiency, objectivity, and rationality. Efficiency is a measurement of 
the appropriateness between the means and the ends as it relates to an 
organization’s goals.30 In other words, to be efficient is to choose the best 
technique to achieve a desired result. Weber argues that particularly in 
modernity, bureaucratic structures are designed around this logic and 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 956–1005. 
 24. We are abridging Weber’s six key characteristics of “modern bureaucracy.” Id. at 
956–58. Furthermore, we are largely referring here to Weber’s “ideal type” of bureaucracy, 
something he says can “seldom if ever” be found in the real world. Id. at 20–21. 
Nevertheless, we follow Weber’s suggestion that compelling analytical value can be 
realized by exploring the essential characteristics of the bureaucratic form particularly in 
attempting to conceptualize what we see as a broad historical shift toward digitalism and 
the related contradictions of “data” obsessed governance. Simply stated, the ideal type is a 
starting point for a more concrete analysis of the bureaucratic qualities of digitalism. For 
a discussion of the analytical benefits and drawbacks of employing the ideal type of 
bureaucracy see MOUZELIS, supra note 16, at 38–54; HIBOU, supra note 5, at xiv–xv. 
 25. See WEBER, supra note 18, at 956?58. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 957. 
 28. See BERGER ET AL., supra note 10, at passim. 
 29. Weber writes, “Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination 
through knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational.” WEBER, 
supra note 18, at 225. See generally JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1986) (identifying 
the “crisis of control” and the resulting “Control Revolution”). 
 30. See MOUZELIS, supra note 16, at 8–10. 
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they become so good at routinizing the means of achieving their ends 
that they resemble well-oiled machines. He notes, “[t]he decisive reason 
for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely 
technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully 
developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations 
exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of 
production.”31 
The second principle is the objectivity of bureaucratic operation, or 
autonomy from the influence of short-term political whims or human 
passions. However, as Weber observes, “[b]ureaucracy develops the 
more perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized,’ the more completely it 
succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all 
purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape 
calculation. This is appraised as its special virtue by capitalism.”32 In 
the public realm, this bureaucratic objectivity reflects the “procedural 
neutrality” of the state,33 or the broader liberal principal of the rule of 
law, both of which are crucial for maintaining the legitimacy of 
bureaucratic rule. In the private realm, the objectivity of bureaucracy 
relates not to politics, or a lack thereof, but rather to the management of 
the enterprise based on techno-scientific principles.34 
Weber’s concept of rationality is notoriously difficult to define and is 
entangled with his broader arguments about modernity and cultural 
meaning. At its simplest, Weberian rationality is the socio-cultural 
manifestation of Western reason in the context of capitalism.35 In 
relation to Weber’s discussion of bureaucratic order, rationality mainly 
refers to the procedural efficacy of bureaucratic operations.36 All 
decisions at every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy should be rational 
to the extent that they employ scientific knowledge to calculate the 
efficiency of the execution of tasks, all in a repetitive manner. As such, 
bureaucracies, according to Weber, leave little room for inefficiencies 
and eventually become machines for “rationalizing” work processes. 
While this version of formal rationality dominates in bureaucratic 
capitalism, and appears as an imposed form of hierarchical domination, 
Weber’s full conception of rationality is more nuanced. Kalberg divides 
Weber’s rationality into four interrelated categories: practical, 
                                                                                                     
 31. See WEBER, supra note 18, at 973. 
 32. Id. at 975. 
 33. Paul du Gay, Bureaucracy and Liberty: State, Authority, and Freedom, in THE 
VALUES OF BUREAUCRACY 41, 48–49 (Paul du Gay ed., 2005). 
 34. See HIBOU, supra note 5, at 16. 
 35. See Herbert Marcuse, Industrialization and Capitalism, I/30 NEW LEFT R., 3,5 
(1965). 
 36. See WEBER, supra note 18, at 973?75. 
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theoretical, substantive, and formal.37 In this article we are mainly 
concerned with the latter two, but the former two are also important. 
Practical or pragmatic rationality is the set of egoistic interests through 
which individuals evaluate mundane day-to-day decisions.38 At a basic 
level it is this rationality that guides routine means-ends actions. 
Theoretical or “intellectual” rationality refers to the conceptual or 
metaphysical framework that most humans find necessary to make 
meaning out of mundane daily life.39 This sort of rationality is not 
directly implicated in actions, but rather in thought and contemplation. 
Substantive rationality is the value-laden framework that helps 
individuals negotiate “reality’s flow of unending empirical events.”40 
This type of rationality does not determine means-ends decisions in the 
same way that practical rationality does. Rather, it is a broader, albeit 
individualized, ethical framework or set of “value postulates”41 through 
which humans determine action in particular situations. Substantive 
rationality is always in relation to a broader theoretical rationality, but 
it is based on an individual perspective and may vary across situations. 
Formal rationality is the depersonalized, even dehumanized, set of 
codified rules, laws, and regulations. This sort of rationality is based on 
scientific and economic calculation, is historically predominant in 
capitalistic societies, and is most closely associated with bureaucratic 
order.  
In these three bureaucratic principles, Weber imagined—in the 
ideal—a level of perfection42 in social administration. As a result, he 
believed that historically bureaucratic administration would emerge as 
the primary form of social organization and wipe away others based on 
inheritance, myth, or charisma. But, for Weber, the adherence to 
rational social ordering by bureaucratic rationality also produced an 
“iron cage,” where substantive rationality was significantly constrained 
across social institutions, with nonconforming action inside 
instrumental bureaucratic structures virtually impossible.43 So while 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Stephen Kalberg, Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the 
Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History, 85 AM. J. SOC. 1145, 1145 (1980). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1153. 
 40. Id. at 1155. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See generally Marcuse, supra note 35 for a lengthy discussion and critique of the 
normative and teleological implications of Weber’s theory of rationality (and bureaucracy). 
 43. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 123 (1978). 
The “iron cage” is an infamously controversial translation by Talcot Parsons from the 
German stahlhartes gehäuse that we will not attempt to adjudicate here, other than to say 
it could instead be translated to something akin to a “shell as hard as steel.” See Peter 
Baehr, The “Iron Cage” and the “Shell as Hard as Steel”: Parsons, Weber, and the 
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the authority of procedure, and the science and hierarchy of decision 
making together produce a separation from whim and passion, the 
trade-off is a level of “disenchantment” that takes its toll on human 
creativity and will, if not liberty.44  
Consequently, bureaucratic social ordering is a means of domination 
in both its hierarchical form but also as a result of its capacity to 
engender in individuals a substantive ethic—or a value system—based 
upon calculation and techno-scientific reason. In other words, capitalism 
is historically remarkable for its capacity to produce an affinity toward, 
or a unity of, ordering across the four categories of rationality, and 
increasingly beyond the formally economic or scientific fields toward—
particularly in neoliberal capitalism—virtually every facet of social life. 
III.  IN-FORMING ORDER 
For much of the twentieth century, the strengths of bureaucratic 
organization were “functionally indispensable to the operation of the 
modern capitalist state and enterprise,”45 not least because of what 
Weber called the “increasing complexity of civilization.”46 The modern 
bureaucratic state, formed from legal-rational principles and designed 
to cope with this complexity, also created a separation from both the 
interests of private capital, on the one side, and the whims of public 
politics, on the other. In other words, the modern bureaucratic state 
claimed its legitimacy through serving a public function—or the 
collective interest—by being blind to the influence of individuals.  
Beniger argues that it was not civilization, per se, but the increasing 
complexity of economic production, distribution, and consumption in the 
Second Industrial Revolution, beginning in the late nineteenth century, 
that created the conditions for the functional centrality of the 
bureaucracy.47 Following advances in telecommunications, which caused 
a “crisis of control” for the socio-economy, the only reasonable solution 
was rationalization through bureaucratic management. For Beniger, 
Weberian rationalization was a practice of “preprocessing” of 
information,48 or the “destruction or ignoring of information in order to 
                                                                                                     
Stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 40 
HIST. & THEORY 153, 153–69 (2001). 
 44. See Michael Reed, Beyond the Iron Cage? Bureaucracy and Democracy in the 
Knowledge Economy and Society, in THE VALUES OF BUREAUCRACY 120 (Paul du Gay ed. 
2005). 
 45. Id. at 119. 
 46. WEBER, supra note 18, at 972. 
 47. See generally BENIGER supra note 29. 
 48. See BENIGER supra note 29, at 390–425. Beniger’s fascinating, book-length 
argument is impossible to succinctly summarize, but his description of the “control 
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facilitate its processing.”49 In this sense, the essence of contemporary 
bureaucracy is its capacity to create abstractions through devices like 
formalized codes, categories, and rules based upon, not actual lived 
experiences but the imperative to govern life through market-like 
mechanisms.50 In other words, the technological transformation of the 
economic system, beginning in the late nineteenth century and 
continuing today, which included an intensifying spatial division of 
labor and the vast circulation of raw and finished goods, necessitated a 
new system for sorting and sifting of immense amounts of information. 
The answer to this systemic need was the modern bureaucracy; it 
provided speed of administrative operation and unique efficiency for 
managing information. As a result, it became the model for both the 
corporation and the state, and thus private and public administration. 
The important question for us is how—and through what kinds of 
processes and logics, and with what kinds of outcomes—have digital 
information technologies changed bureaucratic structures? The 
scholarly literature on digital technologies, as they relate to 
transformations in the socio-economy, is too extensive to attempt to 
summarize here.51 There is a long history of theorizing the information 
society and economy.52 This history goes back at least as far as Bell’s 
1973 argument that post-industrial society would increasingly assume 
                                                                                                     
revolution” of the second industrial revolution is concerned first with the invention of all 
sorts of new information-processing technologies (broadly defined) such as the modern 
typewriter (1873), the stock ticker (1870), and the “systematization of office record 
keeping” (early 1870s), but also things like the first university business, commerce, and 
administration schools (1880s), and the U.S. national professional organization of 
accountants (1886). Id. at 390?91. More importantly, Beniger is interested in various 
components of the “centralized, functionally departmentalized organizational structure in 
the mid-1890s,” which was accompanied by a startling growth in bureaucratic workers. Id. 
at 391. Compared to overall 28% growth of the U.S. workforce between 1900-1910, he cites 
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technical characteristics particularly around the importance of codified 
knowledge.53 More recently, Castells elaborates a “network society” 
where he attempts to grasp the informational flows that underpin 
interconnection and globalization, particularly in relation to the 
changing dynamics of production.54 Benkler, who concentrates on 
shared computing software, extends Castells’s work, focusing on the 
breakdown of centralized and hierarchical organization—or the 
flattening out of processes of production into what he calls “commons-
based peer production” where information is no longer walled off inside 
organizational structures.55 However, there have been far fewer 
attempts to interrogate common processes of social ordering that cut 
across institutional and organizational types.56  
The importance of the bureaucracy as an organizing social 
structure, and its demise, is looming in the background in all of these 
studies. The imminent passing of bureaucratic ordering has been 
predicted since Weber theorized its emergence.57 Not surprisingly, those 
who advocate ending the bureaucratic structuring of social life usually 
invoke some version of the iron cage that might be overcome through 
things such as information sharing, institutional transparency, open 
innovation systems, or just participation. Benkler in particular presents 
a utopian account of the breakdown of hierarchy, organizational 
rigidity, and the exclusively private ownership of the means of 
production, all of which lead to increasing freedom and autonomy for 
individuals.58 In collaboration with others, individuals will build 
networks of information sharing and will, in turn, liberate themselves 
from a reliance on the strictures of formalized and procedural bureaus 
and their incipient forms of information management. A similar set of 
ideas fuel the enthusiasm for cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, the 
celebrants of which argue that decentralized digital networks will 
mitigate both the purported tyranny of state-sponsored central banks 
and excessive surveillance by corporate banks.59 
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Embedded in the critique of bureaucracy is a desire to separate the 
economic and the social, or at least to produce the conditions whereby 
social life and its reproduction need not be dominated by the calculative 
rationality of capitalist bureaucracy.60 Particularly in the late 1960s and 
1970s, the bureaucratic structures that became the basis of social 
organization in the early to mid-twentieth century came to be seen as a 
tool of domination by ‘the establishment.’ In the case of corporate 
bureaucratic apparatuses, they achieved domination by keeping wages 
low. But, both corporate and state bureaucracies preserved what were 
seen as outdated social values including racial and gender 
discrimination, and modes of secrecy that obscured tendencies toward 
imperialism and war.61 At the same time, overly formal social 
organization in general was criticized as an impediment to individual 
development, and this contributed to diminished legitimacy for 
bureaucracies as a means of social administration.62 
If the new communications technologies of the 1980s and 1990s 
were part of the nascent reorganization of the social and likewise 
engendered new forms of consciousness, the digital technologies of today 
constitute a fully-fledged digital way of life. Over the last twenty-five 
years, digital logics, machines, and techniques have moved from the 
background to the foreground of both capitalist production as well as 
capitalist social relations. This is closely related to the growing 
importance of information and knowledge to the production of economic 
value. While the importance of discursive phenomena like the 
“information society” or the “knowledge economy”63 have been hotly 
debated in economics and sociology, there is little question that (1) there 
is simply more data, information, and codified knowledge available, and 
(2) as a result, its management has become considerably more 
complicated.64 
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In the digital economy, consolidating control over information is no 
longer a secondary process in support of some other production process. 
Rather, the management and manipulation of data and information is 
itself increasingly the object of value creation.65 Graeber observes “the 
algorithms and mathematical formulae by which the world comes to be 
assessed become, ultimately, not just measures of value, but the source 
of value itself.”66 But in this reaction to the new control crisis, where 
information management has seemingly switched from the cost of doing 
business, to the actual object of value production, what are the 
consequences for the principles of bureaucracy? Put differently, is it 
possible that the visible manifestations of the bureaucracy as we once 
knew it have been transformed in this rapidly digitized and data-filled 
word, though its organizing logics remain?  
A.  Intelligent Efficiency 
One of the fundamental justifications for the massive expansion of 
digital information technologies has been their purported efficiency.67 Of 
all the reasons efficiency is important for capitalist social relations in 
the twenty-first century, perhaps the two most powerful are financial 
and environmental. Not surprisingly, these are also the two most crisis-
prone spheres of socio-economic life over the last decade.68  
While improving efficiency in these spheres is not unique to the 
digital age, it has taken on greater importance with the advancement of 
information technologies. For much of the political class in the United 
States, and even more so in the United Kingdom and Europe, the 
financial crisis of 2008 has translated into drastic budget cuts or 
“austerity,”69 in what the former U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron 
was fond of calling “doing more with less.”70 Cameron specifically 
addressed “making government digital” in a September 2015 speech 
when he labeled “efficiency” as one of his three principles for “delivering 
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a smarter state.”71 With regard to the environment, reducing the carbon 
footprint of pretty much everything has become a socio-economic 
imperative in the face of human-induced climate change. Attempts to 
more efficiently produce and use energy are heavily dependent on 
information technologies. Just one example is the management of the 
electricity infrastructure through “smart grid” technology, which in turn 
is dependent on an interconnected system of sensors and meters that 
collect information about energy production and consumption.72 
Households can, for example, monitor their usage via dedicated digital 
tools aimed at teaching them the value of switching off lights in unused 
rooms, or appreciate the costs of having digitally-based equipment “on 
standby.” More broadly, while not actually proven to improve efficiency, 
saving time and resources is one of the key driving forces behind the 
“internet of things,”73 or better yet, the “internet of everything”74 where 
all kinds of everyday objects and devices, from the mundane to the 
sophisticated, are connected to wireless networks in hope of saving time 
and energy. 
These two discourses of financial austerity and sustainable 
environments intersect in the smart city discourse.75 In promises of 
more efficiently delivering city services, as well as reducing the carbon 
footprint of urban dwellers and institutions, the data-driven smart city 
represents the vanguard of digital bureaucratic efficiency. Smart city 
boosters, the most influential of whom are private corporations like 
IBM, Cisco, and Siemens, all promise to employ information and 
communication technologies to make more efficient the provision of 
water and electricity, trash and sewer administration, traffic 
management, and policing and public safety.76 Driven by “big data,” it is 
argued that real-time visualizations in centralized control rooms and 
web-based data dashboards allow both city administrators and residents 
to quickly make decisions about broad spheres of governance and urban 
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life.77 And while the surveillance of the city through data collection, 
processing, and visualization represents the frontier of a new realm of 
urban competition78 and modulated social control,79 this is often justified 
through appeals to improving efficiency. 
Here, the acceleration of information collection, its filtering, and 
new forms of provision at the pace of “real time” is one of the key drivers 
of efficiency. However, just because information is available at rapid 
speed does not mean decisions become easier. On the contrary, instead 
of dealing with “batches” of information that may have arrived on a 
weekly, daily, or hourly basis, information now flows through the 
bureaucracy almost constantly.80 While this real-time flow may make 
some decisions easier (or just hidden through automation), it also raises 
expectations for hasty bureaucratic information management, making 
some decision-making more difficult, if not prone to dysfunction and 
crisis.81 But this acceleration is only possible because the process of data 
collection, processing, and presentation has been automated as to 
remove the necessity (or possibility) of human decisions, or at least 
filtered through a system of abstract categories to present humans with 
a limited number of options. This is Weberian efficiency writ large.  
B.  Sizing Up Objectivity 
Similarly, the bureaucratic principle of objectivity is changing in 
relation to digitization, though it has become no less important. Where 
the modern or industrial bureaucratic apparatus once achieved its 
political legitimacy through its separation of the whims and passions of 
politics through professionalization82 on the one hand, and its 
commitment to procedural neutrality, on the other, the digital 
bureaucracy would appear to achieve its legitimacy through apparent 
data and algorithmic neutrality. This is best exemplified through the 
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discourse of “big data” where “big” implies not so much a large size, but 
that data is unfiltered, unadulterated, and semi-autonomous—as if it 
can speak for itself, or for “all of us.” These ontological assumptions 
about data help justify the realist conception that people, institutions, 
and technical sensors simply collect data about a world that already 
exists.  
There is a broadening assumption that the substance of the world is 
data, what Hand refers to as the “Dataverse.”83 Similarly, Kitchin refers 
to the “big” dataset as “n=all.”84 These assumptions lead to the view that 
data is now everything that matters, and conversely everything that 
matters is now data.85 Even for the boosters of data-led governance, this 
may be an exaggeration, but discourses like “evidence-based policy” and 
“data-driven governance” continue to nurture these views. At the same 
time there is a growing realization that the human brain cannot 
actually process and identify patterns out of big data without the 
assistance of machines; indeed, this has become part of the definition.86 
For its own part, “small” data is considered flawed because it cannot be 
sufficiently separated from direct human experience and subjectivity.87 
In the dataverse it is no longer professional autonomy and control of 
the bureaucratic “files” that constitute objective decision making. 
Rather the “post-bureaucratic organization”88 must make sense of data 
in motion. Through sophisticated processes of data capture (e.g., digital 
sensors, internet surveillance, relentless feedback surveys) governance 
systems have gained access to much more data, though in Beniger’s 
terms of a crisis of control, the fundamental problem has not changed. 
While gaining access to data and information continues to be a 
challenge for every institution, the crucial issue is turning data and 
information into useful, meaningful, or actionable knowledge. Simply 
stated, the problem is not a lack of data, it is keeping up with too much 
data moving at speed. 
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Here the algorithm is enrolled as the perfectly objective procedural 
processor; a recursive data filtering mechanism designed to eliminate 
subjective and inefficient human decision-making. This helps explain 
why algorithms are entangled in every socio-economic process that has a 
digital component. Through its capacity as a routinized filtering device, 
the coded algorithm brings single data points with little value or 
meaning into a relation with countless other data points in a process 
which produces a “smoother, more predictable surface for capitalist 
consumption.”89 At the same time, while algorithms are designed by 
people and social institutions and thus value-laden,90 once they begin 
their routinized operation they tend to recede into relative obscurity.  
This rise of algorithms begs us to reconsider one of the key tensions 
in Weber’s theory of bureaucracy. On the one hand, there is the faceless, 
repetitive procedure, resistant to appeals to view individuals as 
anything other than members of an operational category to be 
processed.91 On the other hand, the cold, objective algorithm is relatively 
autonomous from human influence, and thus resists corruption by 
economic or political power. And yet, just like more conventional 
bureaucratic structures, under this surface tension is a deeper 
underlying logic. That is the way the algorithm has become a seamless 
carrier of modernization for the interests of both the political classes 
and capitalist enterprise.92 Put differently, the practical rationality of 
the algorithm quite easily translates into the formal calculative 
rationality that dominates most modern capitalist organizational 
structures, leaving little room for alternative or substantive 
rationalities.  
Finally, in the realm of bureaucratic objectivity, we emphasize the 
importance of quantification, or what Weber called the “romanticism of 
numbers.”93 What began in the emergence of statistics and modernity as 
an “avalanche of numbers”94 has intensified in the digital age. While 
statistical modeling was crucial to the development of the modern 
bureaucratic state, today it seems that almost everything is evaluated 
according to numerical indicators, benchmarks, ratings, and rankings. 
Porter referred to this as the growth of “mechanical objectivity,” where 
numbers are considered more trustworthy than the modified templates 
or contextualized accounts offered by elite, professional, decision-
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makers.95 This notion of objectivity is not, however, limited to facts 
about the external world. On the contrary, the mechanical objectivity of 
numbers is powerful because it tends to reorganize bureaucracies 
around rule-based decision making, where numbers and mathematics 
are better suited to the objectivity of rules—the purest manifestation of 
which is the algorithm. As Porter says, “quantification is a way of 
making decisions without seeming to decide.”96 Indeed there is 
seemingly less room for substantive human decision-making, but only 
because the algorithms have been designed to limit that capacity to 
begin with. In conclusion, we suggest that quantification and numbers, 
with their distinct air of relative disinterest, produce legitimacy for the 
governance mechanisms of neoliberal market society, something that 
relative autonomy did for the Weberian bureaucracy and its political 
institutions. 
C.  Remotely Rational 
To put it in Weber’s terms, the celebrants of the digital information 
revolution argue that digitalism has weakened domination by formal 
rationality by flattening and opening up the structures of socio-economic 
administration. Not least as a result of access to more knowledge and 
information, individuals have more opportunities to cultivate their own 
substantive rationalities, if not influence others by easily distributing 
knowledge. On the surface it certainly appears that formal rationality, 
which became most legible in the bureaucracies of modernity, has come 
under increasing pressure as widely available information and 
knowledge have empowered individual creativity, encouraged 
entrepreneurship, widened opportunities for social networking, and 
engendered social difference.  
Indeed, there is little doubt individuals are now more easily able to 
disseminate information. However, whether individuals are any more 
empowered to actually create new knowledge, and/or whether this 
knowledge has more impact on the structuring of society, is an entirely 
different inquiry. It is quite possible that individual “creativity” or 
entrepreneurship is rather more like a survival mechanism for those 
individuals (the vast majority) who have become disenfranchised from 
the benefits of Fordist bureaucratic structures97 such as the welfare 
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state, organized labor, or just relatively stable employment in a large 
corporation.98 
Our argument is that whilst the bureaucratic skeleton that emerged 
in modernity may be under pressure, its ordering DNA—techno-
scientific rationality—is not.99 It is alternatively, manifesting itself in a 
new, digitized form. Rather than a centralized hierarchy dominated by 
professionals and managed by experts, digital information technologies 
and an intensified division of labor have dispersed bureaucratic logics 
making them less legible, but no less consequential. This is bureaucracy 
at a relative distance. To again invoke Beniger, the digital revolution 
has caused a new “control crisis,” the solution to which includes formal 
bureaucratic rationality, but operating at scattered locations across a 
hybrid of geographic scales.100 
For Hibou, the defining characteristic of bureaucracy is its capacity 
to formalize diverse and contingent social relationships into abstract 
categories that more easily align with calculation and rule-based 
systems.101 In the Weberian bureaucracy of modernity, much of this 
process was driven by the codification of text inscribed on “papers in 
motion” through the bureaucratic structure, and their archiving in “the 
files.”102 Today this formalization and abstraction happens through the 
categorization processes of digital code, which engenders both an 
atomized level of detail as well as increased mobility of information; the 
ultimate goal being the instantaneous diffusion of tightly categorized 
information across space in “real time.”  
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The ability to “know” and thus manage operations at a granular 
level, all within the language of digital code, contributes to an 
environment where different kinds of information and information 
systems across various fields become interoperable.103 And it is in this 
sense that there is an emergence of new socio-informational 
infrastructures104 where human bodies, industrial production, climate-
controlled buildings, and surveillance and policing systems are 
increasingly integrated and assembled into what Kallinikos refers to as 
the common “institutional matrix” of the “modern social 
arrangement.”105 Crucially, however, the interoperability between these 
systems is not driven only by the common language of digital code, but 
an automated rule-based rationality. 
These innovations in digital technologies and their 
“rationalizations” have contributed to an acceleration of the spatio-
temporal dynamics of life. Weber presciently described communications 
infrastructures, as the “pacemakers of bureaucratization”106 and 
suggests that the speed at which public information is circulated “exerts 
a steady and sharp pressure in the direction of speeding up the tempo of 
administrative reaction towards various situations.”107 In the same way 
as paper files, telegraphs, and radio signals in Weber’s time, the “real 
time” and automatic feedback loops108 of digitalism produce both an 
individual and an institutional reorientation toward speed and 
reactivity,109 which as Virilio has pointed out, increasingly resemble 
military style logistical management.110 This constant and 
instantaneous surveillance, measurement, and assessment further 
necessitate bureaucratic alignment with algorithmic governance.  
Where once information and rules, or files and procedures, were 
separated by time and space, real-time algorithmic control has collapsed 
them into governance in motion. Governing in motion sets the tempo, in 
tune with both the cognitive orientation of the neoliberal market 
society, and the rhythm of the digital bureaucracy. Innovation and 
adaptation in this often chaotic environment becomes not only an 
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entrepreneurial strategy but a survival skill.111 Individuals and 
institutions that are unable or unwilling to keep pace are simply left 
behind.  
This new temporal logic of instant feedback and real-time 
innovation is not limited to formal institutions and organizations. It is 
also integrated into the thoughts and bodies of workers and consumers 
through constant processes of valuation and measurement.112 For 
instance, personal identity is increasingly entangled with social 
media113 as people spend significant time managing their online life, 
including the ways their identity and real-time locations are marketized 
in the “like economy.”114 
It is through such valuations that a different kind of future is now 
imagined and produced, in turn constituting this new organizational 
form. Gone is the Weberian bureaucracy’s assumed possibility of 
upward progression through large hierarchical organizations or the 
“internal labor market.”115 Experience and loyalty, once valued by large 
organizations,116 are now traded for the ubiquitous demeanor of “talent,” 
which is itself parsed as the quality of adaptability to novel and often 
chaotic conditions. Permanent disruption and innovation replace 
relative stability and security, whilst the ad hoc project team replaces 
Weber’s bureaucratic experts.117 Furthermore, the routinization that 
Weber identified and compared with machines has been intensified 
where seemingly almost any repetitive process can now be mechanized 
through digital algorithms leaving behind a growing reserve army of 
labor that puts downward pressure on wages.118 
There is little question that digital information technologies have 
reframed bureaucratic rationality. But instead of opening it up to 
alternative values they have, instead, intensified its techno-scientific 
character. While, on the surface, digital information technologies allow 
for the reproduction of existing, and cultivation of new, substantive 
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rationalities, the dominant techno-scientific rationality of modernity is 
enhanced, not diluted by digitalism. Put differently, while the 
conventional bureaucratic structure appears to be disintegrated and 
dispersed, the social order engendered by information technologies 
transports the logic of bureaucracy more deeply into society. The effect 
is something like Bauman’s “fluid modernity,” where the market 
becomes the perfectly adaptable (price) mechanism through which to 
order society, and explains why as Hibou argues, “we are all neoliberal 
bureaucrats.”119 
This does not mean that hierarchical organization has disappeared. 
It is simply located in a different place—the digital platform, where the 
filtering and enclosure of information is more important than the 
explicit discipline and enclosure of laboring bodies on the factory floor or 
in the corporate cubical.120  
One example that has recently attracted attention is the Chinese 
state’s pilot “social credit system” where every citizen and company will 
be assigned a trustworthiness score.121 The plan is for the score to 
automatically update based on innumerable digitally traceable social 
interactions from minor traffic violations to using the Internet to falsely 
accuse others, to whether one has provided suitable care for aging 
parents.122 Similar to credit scoring in the United States, though on a 
colossal scale, the system will be fueled by big data and driven by an 
algorithmic logic that both disciplines society as well as capital. A 
particular concern is fraudulent corporations that have, for instance, 
marketed tainted baby formula and all in an effort to improve the 
functioning of China’s growing market economy. As a digital footprint, 
the score would determine the possibility of travelling abroad, placing 
children in particular schools, or even getting a seat in a top restaurant. 
This is a fascinating example of the transformation of more 
conventional state bureaucracy into a digitized social order; one where 
the formal rationality of quantification and calculation now give new 
form to efficiency, objectivity, and rationality. Not unlike a conventional 
bureaucracy, there is little room here for substantive interpretation, 
exceptions, or alternatives, and while the authority of the state may be 
less visible, there is little question it is operating in the shadow of the  
platform.  
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Figure 1 
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IV.  DIGITAL NEOLIBERALISM MEANS (AND ENDS) 
Our 21st Century communication network, regarded by its early 
adherents with a religious fervor, has been turned into a surveillance 
and advertising mechanism. The World Wide Web is just that—a web 
that ensnares everyone who uses it. 
 
–T Bone Burnett, September, 2016123 
 
What, then, of the politics surrounding these digital 
transformations? Does society, or the public, retain any power to decide 
how—if at all—these technologies should be employed to achieve 
particular ends? In other words, might one assume that these 
technologies are ultimately subject to both individual human will and/or 
democratic institutions? At least in the current political environment, 
our answers to these questions are relatively pessimistic. In this section, 
we outline our main reasons for this pessimism. They are all related to 
the erosion of the boundary between the social and the economic that is 
one of the key characteristics of neoliberal order.124 As mentioned above, 
erosion of this boundary is one of the qualities of a conventional 
bureaucratic structure where formal calculative rationality tends to 
dominate, but we see an intensification of this erosion in neoliberalism. 
As a result, the possibility of a social ethics—one where social ends 
might be agreed on or even just debated—is seriously diminished. 
While Weber explains the efficiency of bureaucracies in the terms of 
appropriate means to achieve particular ends, he is not naïve about the 
possibility of the means becoming a driving force. In fact, one of the 
enduring criticisms of bureaucracy is that it becomes internally 
obsessed with its own reproduction and loses sight of its larger purpose. 
Weber explains at length how difficult it can be to dislodge a 
bureaucratic structure once it is firmly in place.125 Castells, who is more 
explicitly critical of bureaucracy, actually defines the organizational 
type by the characteristic of a focus on means over ends.126  
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Nevertheless, during the post-World War II height of Fordism, 
embedded liberalism, or what Bauman called “solid modernity,”127 the 
bureaucratic welfare states of Western Europe and the United States 
were largely successful in producing socially beneficial ends. Inequality 
was reduced, the social safety net protected the most vulnerable, 
speculative finance was tightly controlled, and supported by state 
institutions, capital and labor compromised to the benefit of the working 
and middle classes. 
Furthermore, during the middle of the twentieth century there was 
a widespread assumption of a socially progressive telos. One of the key 
components of modernity was that modernization would deliver, over 
time, “development” for all nation-states, especially those in the Global 
South.128 There was a widespread notion that intellectual knowledge or 
reason, operationalized through science and technology, and enabled to 
do public work through rationalized politics, would eventually improve 
the conditions for everyone. While this linear development model, 
envisioned by scholars such as Walt Rostow, was in many ways flawed 
(i.e., “written” from the Global North and largely built on racist, 
colonial, and imperial logics, as well as carried out through highly 
gendered and racist institutions), it was also based on the ethos that 
those individuals who “played by the rules,” or abided by the dominant 
rationality, would be rewarded.129 In other words, it was assumed that 
science and technology enacted through formal and relatively rigid 
social structures were the means to a broader end of social development.  
The digital, as a basis of social organization, comes at a time when 
this imagined telos of modernity has largely disappeared, and been 
replaced with a neoliberal capitalist ethos, where economic development 
is both the means and the end of social development. After the “end of 
history,” or the end of actually existing communism, it is much more 
difficult to theorize an outside to capitalism, or invoke social 
emancipation and development as a public good outside of the terms, 
motives, and means of private profit and economic growth.130 This is not 
to suggest that modernity was somehow purely driven by emancipatory 
goals. The seeds of the post-modern obsession with creative destruction, 
ephemerality, and uber-flexibility were important parts of both 
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enlightenment thought and the social structures of modernity.131 These 
qualities simply became more dominant in the socio-cultural structures 
of post-modernism, or what in political-economic terms we should call 
neoliberalism.  
These conditions have worsened since the 1970s to the point where 
there is now hardly the political possibility of debating, let alone 
mandating, social ends via state means. As Davies points out, the more 
that the state relies on the calculative rationality of markets in an effort 
to appear objective and in turn regain legitimacy, the less authority it is 
able to retain.132 The neoliberal state, having mostly given up on 
appealing to an external social referent, has lost the moral authority to 
act in most social contexts. Instead the state is dominated by economic 
and financial calculation. However, this logic hardly lends itself to 
widespread legitimacy to accomplish anything other than constant 
attempts to reproduce the conditions for economic growth, or to just 
reproduce the market itself. In the United States and the United 
Kingdom in particular, this has contributed to a delegitimization of 
most public administration, in many cases reducing state bureaucracy 
to its capacity to encourage competition between private actors. 
These conditions are only worsened in an environment where both 
the state and private capital are increasingly adopting the general logic 
of mechanized technologies—or what Ellul calls “technique.”133 Carried 
by digital technologies, and emboldened by hegemonic discourses 
around the centrality of technical innovation, every social process now 
seems to be subject to the “disruptive” forces of, and potential within, 
the digital. Ellul’s point, made in the 1950s, was that technical 
procedures and processes were no longer something that “man” put to 
use for particular ends, but that technique had become an end in 
itself.134 He called it “the consciousness of the mechanized world” that 
“does in the domain of the abstract what the machine did in the domain 
of labor.”135 For Ellul, technique had become the very substance of 
society. This matters because digital code, the digital algorithm, and the 
digital platform are nothing if not dominated by the recursive logic of 
machines.136 In this sense, the digital machines that drive social 
administration are examples of a perfectly calculative apparatus. 
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This also helps explain why there is an “elective affinity,” between 
market “solutions” to political problems and the reformatted principles 
of bureaucracy in the digital age. Setting aside the contradictions of 
technological advance in capitalism, in the sphere of private enterprise 
it is relatively straightforward that capital would put digital means to 
work to achieve the ends of competing for profitability in the market. 
But in the sphere of public administration, the neoliberal evacuation of 
collective goals plug into the relative disinterest of digitized objectivity 
and the relative distance between state bureaucrats and the governed, 
separated by the formalization of the algorithm or the rationalization of 
the platform. For a neoliberal thinker, like Hayek, market mechanisms 
ought to replace centralized and relatively autonomous state 
bureaucracies exactly because they wrongly assume to grasp social 
ends.137 In this sense, encouraging the marketization of the pre-
processing of bureaucratic information through routinized filters aligns 
perfectly with neoliberal ideology by doubly removing the possibility of 
public interference—once through the private market and once through 
technique. After all, for many neoliberals, the market is assumed to 
take the place of human knowledge and judgment, if not turning 
ignorance of anything resembling society into a virtue.138 
To summarize, the emergence of digital media has been concurrent 
with the emergence of a neoliberal political economy, which is consonant 
with a bureaucratic rationality where innovation, adaptability, and 
efficiency are the functional means, but without the progressive ends. In 
other words, innovation, adaptability, and efficiency are the means 
without purpose or intent—at least outside of the logics of wealth 
accumulation. They are the means and the ends. This is driven by what 
Davies,139 gesturing to Weber, calls the “disenchantment of politics” 
where political discourse is delegitimized as ambiguous, subjective, and 
irrational.140 In neoliberal politics there is little room for a discussion of 
public goods,141 and discussions of society are almost exclusively framed 
by “financial realities.” 
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V.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS (IN MOTION) 
These pieces are written at that border between what one knows 
and what one thinks it might be possible to think, between what little 
one grasps and the great gulf of ignorance which that partial grasp 
reveals. 
 
–Nikolas Rose—Powers of Freedom142 
 
In writing this paper, we have constantly found ourselves writing at 
the edge of our capacity to grasp, in part because our cognitive frames 
for understanding are anchored in a relatively distant world, and in 
part because information economies and the “data revolution” conceal so 
much of what could and should be revealed. Not only is it difficult to 
bring some of these processes into clear view, it is even harder to predict 
just what sort of society will emerge over the next generations as digital 
technologies become ever more prevalent in daily life. Where will the 
line fall between a world fully engrossed with data in motion, and a 
world where new, nondigital, possibilities emerge? Put another way, 
will data in motion over-determine, for example, the future shape of the 
globally-ranked university, as it becomes a recursive socio-technical 
machine for producing ranking data? Will the city cease to be a system 
of living and working communities, but rather become a recursive 
engine for producing smart city efficiencies? Will the logistical 
management of the socio-economy no longer be a coordinating 
undercurrent, but the productive object of value itself? If the answer to 
these sorts of questions is “yes,” the silicon web may be more like 
Weber’s iron cage than even our relatively gloomy account has 
suggested.  
There is considerable risk that governing the social, already 
significantly de-legitimated by neoliberalism, is further undermined by 
digitalism. When relative autonomy is replaced by the projection of 
relative disinterest, and where Westphalian democratic orders are 
undermined by governing in motion, and governing through relative 
distance, shortfalls in legitimacy emerge and questions of rule are 
posed. In other words, if digital technologies are no longer just tools we 
employ to accomplish tasks but they become the task and the object 
itself, as well as an authority in neoliberal market societies, the ethics of 
public or democratic authority will continue to suffer. This is where we 
must consider the very possibility that the logic of the algorithm is more 
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than that which drives the digital machine. Rather, we need to ask to 
what extent the logic of the algorithm is the new ordering and 
organizing device of social opportunities, identities, consciousness, and 
life itself? We ought to furthermore ask if there are limits to a mode of 
production that seems to produce profits by rationalizing social order 
itself.  
Undoubtedly, social systems are unpredictable and difficult to 
enclose. Even recursive algorithms engaging in real time with the social 
world will occasionally produce the unexpected. Viewed in this way, it is 
likely that the diffusion of information and the forms of consciousness 
and socialities that are opened up might well prove too difficult to 
contain in a metaphoric silicon web. In this light, maybe “hacktivism” or 
online “culture jamming”143 ought to be celebrated as crucial forms of 
resistance. Just as there was nothing inevitable about the advancement 
of modernity through the conventional bureaucracy, the growth of 
digitized bureaucratic administration is contingent and reversible. 
Nonetheless, as long as the private accumulation of capital is both the 
technique and the goal of socio-economic life, and the socio-economy 
continues to produce exponentially more data and information, the 
silicon web will only become more sticky, rigid, and difficult to 
dismantle.  
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